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JURISDICTION
First Security Leasing Company (MFirst Security-) agrees
with Appellant Russell W. Sanderson ("Sanderson") that this Court
has jurisdiction to hear this appeal,
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
A.

Whether the district court correctly concluded that

First Security's Operations Procedures Manual and certain alleged
oral assurances did not demonstrate an intent by First Security to
alter Sanderson's established at-will employment to terminate only
for cause or to continue employment for a specified period.
B.

Whether the district court correctly concluded that

Utah does not recognize a cause of action for violation of a
covenant of good faith and fair dealing in implied employment
contracts.
C.

Whether the district court correctly concluded that

even if Sanderson could establish that the alleged oral assurances
constitute an implied employment contract, he is not entitled to
recover damages for emotional distress under a contract claim.
D.

Whether the district court properly allowed the

filing of Sanderson's deposition to allow consideration thereof on
appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
First Security is in general agreement with Sanderson's
Statement of the Case.

As will be discussed below, however, First
-1-

Security does not agree that Sanderson is entitled to recover
damages for emotional distress, nor does First Security agree that
the district court did not have before it the relevant portions of
Sanderson's deposition,
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Sanderson was hired by First Security Leasing in October
of 1980.

In 1984, he became manager of the Equipment Services

Division and of the Account Services Department.
Depo., pp. 53-55, R. 311.)

(Sanderson

Sanderson never had a written

employment agreement with First Security Leasing.
During Sanderson's employment at First Security,
Sanderson received an Employee Benefits Handbook entitled
••Benefits and Policies Overview" (hereinafter referred to as the
-Employee Benefits Handbook").
R. 311.)

(Sanderson depo., pp. 236-37,

Throughout his employment at First Security Sanderson

had access to the Employee Benefits Handbook.
p. 237, R. 311.)

(Sanderson depo.,

Page 6 of the Employee Benefits Handbook, under

a section heading entitled "Employment Duration," provides as
follows:
Employment with First Security is 'at-will'
employment and is, therefore, not for any fixed
period of time. Your employment with First
1

A copy of the pertinent provisions of the Employee Benefits
Handbook, Record Pages 80-81, is attached as Exhibit "A".
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SfiCUritv is at the will and discretion of First

Security enfl may be terminated at any time by
First Security or by you as an employee.
(Exhibit T ,

p. 6, emphasis added.)

Sanderson understood the

language quoted above to mean that First Security Leasing could
dismiss him at any time just as he could quit at any time.
(Sanderson depo., p. 238, R. 311.)
During his employment at First Security Leasing,
Sanderson also received and read a handbook entitled "First
Security Standards for Employee Conduct" (hereinafter referred to
as the "Standards Handbook"). 2

Page 5 of the Standards Handbook,

under a section heading entitled "General Statement of Policy,"
provides as follows:
Employment with First Security is 'at-will'
employment and is, therefore, not for any fixed
period of time. Your employment with First
Security is at the wjXl and discretion of First
Security and may be ended at any time by First
Security or by you as an employee.
(Exhibit "B", p. 5, emphasis added.)
On an annual basis, First Security employees were
required to sign a "Statement of Compliance with Standards"
certifying that:
(1) I have fully read and understand First
Security's Standards for Employee Conduct, PER-91. . . .
^A copy of the pertinent provisions of the Standards Handbook,
Record Pages 83-84, is attached as Exhibit "B".
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Sanderson signed his most recent "Statement of Compliance with
Standards" on April 25, 1988. 3
Sanderson understood from the above-quoted paragraphs of
the Standards Handbook that he did not have an employment contract
for any specific period and that First Security Leasing could
terminate him at any time.
R. 311.)

(Sanderson Depo., pp. 242-244,

Moreover, neither the Employee Benefits Handbook nor the

Standards Handbook provides, nor was Sanderson ever informed, that
his employment at First Security Leasing was for a specific period
of time or that he would be terminated only for cause or only
after following certain termination procedures.
and

M

(See Exhibits "A"

B W .)
Between September of 1988 and May of 1989, Sanderson was

hospitalized approximately six times.

He rarely came to work.

(Sanderson Depo., pp. 162, 173-74, R. 311.)

During that time

period, neither Sanderson nor First Security Leasing knew from
week to week when he would return to work full time.
Depo., p. 178, R. 311.)

(Sanderson

Sanderson was relieved of his respon-

sibilities as Account Service Manager in December 1988, and in

3

A copy of that Statement of Compliance with Standards, Record
Page 86, is attached as Exhibit f,C".
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April 1989, Gary Judd ("Judd") was given responsibility for
Equipment Services.

(Sanderson Depo., p. 340, R. 311,)

In April 1989, Judd, assisted by others, performed an
audit of Equipment Services and located numerous problems both
with reports that had been filed as well as procedures followed by
those in that department under Sanderson's direction.

Because

Sanderson refused to commit to any time when he would return to
work, and because Sanderson claimed he was presently under a lot
of stress, First Security Leasing offered to transfer Sanderson to
another position.

Sanderson refused the transfer.4

(Sanderson

Depo. pp. 225-28, R. 311.)
The Operations Procedures Manual section which Sanderson
contends creates an implied contract (O.P. 6-5.2) merely contains
guidelines which First Security Leasing management may follow at
its discretion when dealing with disciplinary problems:
POLICY
1. First Security follows the Managing
for Improvement Procedure as a guideline for
disciplinary action taken by management for all
^In both the Statement of Facts and the Argument, Sanderson makes
much of the dispute between the parties regarding (1) whether
Sanderson quit or was terminated or (2) whether there was cause
for Sanderson's termination. Those issues are simply not relevant
to this appeal. The only issue is whether Sanderson was an
at-will employee who could be terminated without cause.

-5-

First Security
employees. . . .
added.)5

(Emphasis

In addition, O.P. 6-5.2 provides that the termination procedures
set forth therein need not be followed depending on the
circumstances:
TERMINATION GUIDELINES
6. In situations where employee behavior
warrants immediate termination, the stages of
this process do not need to be followed.
Termination of these cases must be approved by
the appropriate Division/Subsidiary Head Office.
(Exhibit "D", If 6. )
Sanderson concedes that there is nothing in O.P. 6-5.2
that assures that the disciplinary guidelines are mandatory.
Instead, Sanderson contends only that in his experience those
guidelines have been followed with respect to involuntarily
terminated First Security Leasing employees.
p. 256, 347-355, R. 311.)

(Sanderson Depo.,

Sanderson named four employees he

believed were terminated pursuant to O.P. 6-5.2.

(ill.) A review

of the files of the four named individuals shows that only one of
the four were subject to the guidelines of O.P. 6-5.2.

(Affidavit

of T. D. Edmunds, Tlf 3-7, R. 91-94; Supplemental Affidavit of
T. D. Edmunds, If 4, R. 108-115.)

D

A copy of O.P. 6-5.2, Record Pages 88-90 and 139-141, is attached
as Exhibit "DM.
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Sanderson also relies on alleged "assurances" given by
C. S. "Bud" Cummings (-Cummings") that Sanderson could "take all
the time [he] needed, do whatever needed to be done.
was ready to come back, the job would be there."
Depo., p. 244, R. 311.)

When [he]

(Sanderson

Sanderson cannot remember the specifics

of the assurances allegedly made by Cummings or when or where they
were made.

(Sanderson Depo., pp. 244, 246, 254, R. 311.)

Cummings did not specifically assure Sanderson of a particular
job.

(Sanderson Depo., pp. 244-45, R. 311.)

Moreover, the

assurances were allegedly made by Cummings during a period of time
in which Sanderson was explaining to Cummings his concerns about
his medical and emotional problems.

(Sanderson Depo., p. 339,

R. 311.)
In this contract action, Sanderson seeks, in reliance on
the alleged oral assurances, to recover the tort damages of mental
and emotional distress, anxiety and depression, mental anguish,
damages to his name and reputation, and loss of benefits.
(Complaint, If 21, R. 6-7.)

Sanderson has not asserted (nor could

he successfully do so) a claim for intentional or negligent
infliction of emotional distress.

-7-

(Complaint, R. 2-10.)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.

THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO EVIDENCE THAT FIRST SECURITY LEASING
COMPANY AND SANDERSON INTENDED TO CREATE A CONTRACT FOR A
SPECIFIC TERM OR AGREED TO TERMINATE THEIR RELATIONSHIP
FOR CAUSE ALONE.
In this action, Sanderson contends that his established

at-will employment relationship with First Security Leasing was
altered by (a) a section of First Security Leasing's Operating
Procedures Manual and (b) alleged oral assurances by a First
Security Leasing employee.

To avoid summary judgment Sanderson

was required to show that the manuals and/or assurances
"demonstrate the intent to terminate only for cause or to continue
employment for a specified period.'*

Berube v. Fashion Centre,

Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033, 1044 (Utah 1989).

Sanderson failed to meet

that burden.
A.

The Handbooks Clearly And Unequivocally Provide That
Sanderson Was An At-Will Employee.
The intent of First Security and Sanderson concerning

Sanderson's employment-at-will status is clearly and unequivocally
spelled out in the handbooks he received.

Sanderson acknowledged

in writing on an annual basis that he understood that there was
not a contract between him and First Security and that he could be
terminated at any time.

Therefore, there is no reasonable basis

for Sanderson to conclude that First Security intended to create
any employment relationship other than an at-will relationship.
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B.

The Discretionary Guidelines For Discipline In Thg
Operations Procedures Manual Po Not Alter Sanderson's
At-will status.
Unless the language of a handbook or procedures manual is

mandatory and clearly promises that specific disciplinary procedures will be followed, the handbook or procedures manual does not
and should not create contractual rights in the plaintiff.

O.P.

6-5.2 merely suggests discretionary guidelines which may be used
when dealing with discipline problems.

Moreover, O.P. 6-5.2

provides that the procedure set forth therein need not be followed
depending on the circumstances.

Therefore, even if the guidelines

were part of an implied employment contract, O.P. 6-5.2 does not
alter Sanderson's at-will status.
C.

The Alleged Oral Statements Are Far From A "Clear And
Unequivocal" Offer Of Continued Or Specified Employment.
Sanderson has the burden of establishing that the alleged

oral assurances are not simply encouragement or optimism, but
instead constitute a "clear and unequivocal" offer by First
Security Leasing of (a) employment for a specified period of time
or (b) that he would be terminated only for cause.
Sanderson has not come forward with any evidence which
even suggests that First Security made him an offer of employment
for a specified period or that he would be terminated only for
cause.

He concedes that First Security Leasing did not offer him

either lifetime employment or employment for any specified
duration.

Sanderson does not contend that any assurance was made
-9-

that he would be terminated only for cause.

The extent of the

oral assurances upon which Sanderson relies is simply that when he
recovered from his medical and emotional problems
be there."

H

the job would

The statements of Cummings, even if made, amount only

to encouragement and optimism and do not rise to the level of an
offer for a specified period of employment.
II.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DECIDED SANDERSON'S BREACH OF
CONTRACT/WRONGFUL DISCHARGE CLAIM AS A MATTER OF LAW.
First Security has established by uncontroverted evidence

that O.P. 6-5.2 is discretionary and does not promise that any
specific disciplinary procedures will be followed, and that the
alleged oral assurances do not contain any of the essential terms
of a contractual offer for continued employment.

Sanderson,

therefore, has the burden of showing by specific facts that First
Security intended to alter his at-will employment status.

As he

has not come forward with any such evidence, the district court
was correct in granting summary judgment.
III. UTAH HAS NOT RECOGNIZED A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR VIOLATION OF A
COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING IN EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS.
Berube and several subsequent Utah decisions have made it
clear that MUtah law does not recognize a cause of action for
violation of a covenant of good faith and fair dealing" in
employment contracts.

Loose v. Nature-All Corporation, 785 P.2d

1096, 1098 (Utah 1989).
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IV.

DAMAGES FOR EMOTIONAL DISTRESS ARE NOT RECOVERABLE UNDER
PLAINTIFF'S CONTRACT CLAIM.
In Berube, the court recognized that actions such as

Sanderson's are actions in contract.

Therefore, Sanderson is not

entitled to recover mental distress or the other similar tort
damages sought unless he alleges and proves an independent claim
for intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress.

As

Sanderson has not even asserted such claims, nor could he
establish the requisite elements of such claims, the district
court correctly found that he is not entitled to recover damages
for mental distress.
V.

THE DISTRICT COURT WAS CORRECT IN ALLOWING THE FILING OF
SANDERSON'S DEPOSITION.
For a number of reasons, the district court correctly

allowed the filing of Sanderson's deposition, even though First
Security cited but did not attach pages of that deposition to its
Motion for Summary Judgment.

First, under the Utah Code of

Judicial Administration, First Security had the option of either
citing to or attaching the deposition pages relied upon.
Sanderson had the opportunity below to object to, refute or
explain those citations.

To the extent he did not, the district

court was entitled to rely upon First Security's statements of
fact as being accurate reflections of Sanderson's deposition
transcript.
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In addition, Sanderson's deposition must be filed before
any portion of that deposition may be considered by an appellate
court.

If the deposition had not been filed, Sanderson would have

absolutely no evidence before either the district court or this
Court that First Security intended to alter his at-will employment
status, as he relies solely on his deposition to support his claim.
Finally, even if it were necessary to provide the
district court with the relevant pages of Sanderson's deposition,
all of the deposition pages and other documents First Security
relied upon regarding every material issue in the Motion for
Summary Judgment were attached to either First Security's or
Sanderson's memorandum and provided to the district court.
ARGUMENT
I.

THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO EVIDENCE THAT FIRST SECURITY LEASING
COMPANY AND SANDERSON INTENDED TO CREATE A CONTRACT FOR A
SPECIFIC TERM OR AGREED TO TERMINATE THEIR RELATIONSHIP
FOR CAUSE ALONE.
In this action, Sanderson contends that his established

at-will employment relationship with First Security Leasing was
altered by (a) a section of First Security Leasing's Operating
Procedures Manual ("O.P. 6-5.2") and (b) alleged oral assurances
by a First Security Leasing employee.

In support of his claim,

Sanderson relies on Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d
1033 (Utah 1989), the case in which this Court recognized that

-12-

employment manuals and oral assurances may b demonstrate the
parties' intent to change an employee's at-will status•
This court specifically held in Berube, however, that the
presumption of at-will employment may be overcome only if the
plaintiff carries the burden of showing that the manuals and/or
assurances "demonstrate the intent to terminate only for cause or
IsL. at 1044.

to continue employment for a specified period."

In

determining whether the parties intended to agree to terminate the
relationship for cause alone, traditional requirements of contract
formation are applied.

As a result, the plaintiff must show more

than "subjective understandings or expectations."
Development Co., 719 P.2d 83, 86 (Utah 1986).

Rose v. Allied

Instead, the

written or oral assurances relied upon must indicate "a clear
intention on the employer's part to surrender its . . . power to
terminate its employees at will."

Butterfield v. Citibank of

South Dakota, N.A., 437 N.W.2d 857, 859 (S.D. 1989); see Berube,
771 P.2d at 1044 ("employment contracts should be construed to
give effect to the intent of the parties"); Rose, 719 P.2d at 86.

throughout his brief, Sanderson suggests that Berube established
that employee handbooks always give rise to binding implied-infact contracts. To the contrary, Berube holds that in very
limited circumstances manuals may give rise to an implied
contract, i.e., only if such manuals show the intent of the
parties to alter the employment-at-will relationship and to
terminate only for cause or to continue employment for a specified
period.

-13-

The district court below correctly concluded that the
evidence, as a matter of law, was insufficient that First Security
and Sanderson intended to create a contract for a specified term
or to terminate their relationship for cause alone.

To the

contrary, First Security's Employee Benefits Handbook and
Standards Handbook clearly and unambiguously show the intent of
the parties that Sanderson was an at-will employee who could be
dismissed with or without cause at any time,

Sanderson's

established employment-at-will status was not altered or amended
by either the Operations Procedures Manual or the alleged oral
assurances.

The Operations Procedures Manual merely provides

discretionary guidelines to supervisory personnel which may be
followed by management in addressing discipline problems.

The

alleged oral assurances that Sanderson's job "would be there" when
he overcame his mental and emotional problems fall well short of
being an unequivocal contractual offer for employment for a
specified period, or an offer to terminate only for cause which
could alter Sanderson's at-will employment.
A.

The Handbooks Clearly And Unequivocally Provide That
Sanderson Was An At-Will Employee.
The intent of First Security and Sanderson concerning

Sanderson' employment-at-will status is set forth clearly in the
Employee Benefits Handbook and the Standards Handbook he
received.

The Employee Benefits Handbook states:

-14-

EMPLOYMENT DURATION
Employment with First Security is 'at-will'
employment and is, therefore, not for any fixed
period of time. Your employment with First
Security is at the will and discretion of First
Security and may be terminated at any time by
First Security or by you as an employee.
(Exhibit "A", p. 6, emphasis added.)
Likewise, the Standards Handbook provides:
There may be occasions when First Security
must change rules or give current rules a
different interpretation than previously made.
First Security has the right to modify
policies, both written and unwritten.
* * *

Employment with First Security is
•at-will' and is, therefore, not for any fixed
period of time. Your employment is at the will
ended at any time by First Security or by you
as an employee.
(Exhibit M B", p. 5, emphasis added.)
On an annual basis, Sanderson signed statements acknowledging that he read and understood the Standards Handbook.

In

addition, Sanderson testified at his deposition that he understood
from the Standards Handbook that there was not a contract between
him and First Security Leasing, that he could be terminated at any
time, and that First Security had the right to modify any of its
procedures:
Q.

[Ms. Smith] I'd like you to turn to page
five, which is the general statement of
policy in the First Security standards for
-15-

employment conduct. I'd like you to look
at the third paragraph down. I'd like you
to read that aloud for the record?
[Mr. Sanderson] [Reads first paragraph of
the Standards Handbook quoted above.]
What is your understanding of that
paragraph?
[Objection by Mr. Wycoff to the form of
the question.]
Well, I think basically it speaks for
itself. As I can see it First Security
has the right to change policy.
It also says that you don't have a
contract with First Security doesn't it?
[Objection by Mr. Wygoff to the form of
the question.]
That's what it says.
Look at the next paragraph.
Okay.
What does that say?
It brings up "at will" again.
What does it say.

Read it?

[Reads second paragraph of the Standards
Handbook quoted above.]
It says your employment may be ended at
any time by First Security, correct?
That's what it says.
What is your understanding of that?
[Objection by Mr. Wycoff to the form of
the question.]
-16-

A.

It tells me according to the sentence that
they can terminate me at any time.

Q.

Just as you can quit at any time?

A.

At any time?

Q.

You signed a statement saying you read and
understood this manual, correct?

A.

I did.

Yes.

(Sanderson Depo., pp. 241-243, R. 178-180, 311.)
Having acknowledged that he read and understood that his
employment with First Security was at-will, there is no reasonable
basis for Sanderson to conclude that First Security would
terminate him only for cause or that First Security Leasing
intended to create any employment relationship other than
at-will.

See e.g. Dell v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 811 F.2d 970,

974 (6th Cir. 1987) (relying on a similar "sign off sheet" in
which plaintiff acknowledged that his employment was at-will).

B.

TheJDiscr&,tiQnaryJlul<3elines

FojL.DisgijS.line_InJThe

Operations Procedures Manual Do Not Alter Sanderson's
At-Will Status.
Notwithstanding his acknowledgement that he read »nd
understood the Standards Handbook, Sanderson contends that O.P.
6-5.2 gives him the contractual right to be discharged only
pursuant to the discipline guidelines provided.

Unless the

language of a handbook or procedures manual is mandatory and
clearly promises that specific disciplinary procedures will be
followed, however, the handbook or procedures manual does not and
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should not create contractual rights in the plaintiff.

See

Tolbert v. St. Francis Extended Care Center, 545 N.E.2d 384, 386
(111. Ct. App. 1989).
Procedures which are merely "guidelines" simply do not
create an implied contract that those procedures will be followed
in all cases or indicate an intent by the employer to give up its
right to terminate at-will.

See Butterfield v. Citibank of South

Dakota, 437 N.W.2d 857, 859-60 (S.D. 1989) (language of a handbook
permitting Citibank to discharge employees without notice in
-appropriate instances" was found to reflect the at-will status of
its employees); Shah v. General Electric Company, 697 F. Supp.
946, 948 (D. Kentucky 1988); Mursch v. Van Porn Co., 851 F.2d 990,
995 (7th Cir. 1988) (the court found that w[i]n contrast to the
repeated mandatory and unambiguous language in the Hyatt Handbook
• . . the provisions of Mursch*s employment manual are expressly
denominated as 'guidelines' and are couched in permissive
language.")
The rationale for not construing guidelines to create
contractual rights is explained in Vancheri v. GNLV Corp., 777
P.2d 366, 369-70 (Nev. 1989):
Standardized disciplinary procedures are
generally positive additions to a business. They
provide employers a method of cautioning employees,
and afford employees an opportunity to improve job
performance in order to retain employment. They
also create a general consistency and security in
the work place. If we were to hold that the
establishment of standard disciplinary procedures
-18-

is, in and of itself, sufficient to convert an
at-will employee to an employee who could be fired
only for cause, employers would be reluctant to
continue to establish them.
Based upon the law and policy considerations,
we hold that general expressions of job longevity
and advancement and the established disciplinary
procedure as described in this case, are not, as a
matter of law, sufficient to establish a prima

LaQijLJiase

rebutting that at-will employment

presumption.
(Emphasis added.)
Sanderson does not challenge the above authority7, but
instead contends that the discipline guidelines in O.P. 6-5.2 are
mandatory.

In so contending, Sanderson relies on (a) the language

of O.P. 6-5.2; (b) his -belief that the procedures of O.P. 6-5.2
were mandatory; and (c) his contention that O.P. 6-5.2 was

'Sanderson discusses Piacitelli v. Southern Utah State College,
636 P.2d 1063 (Utah 1981) and Arnold v. B.J. Titan Services
Company, 783 P.2d 541 (Utah 1989). Neither case discusses the
distinction between mandatory and discretionary termination
procedures, and neither case suggests that discretionary
guidelines such as O.P. 6-5.2 indicate an intent to alter at-will
employment status. In Piacitelli, the issue of whether a
personnel manual created contractual rights in the plaintiff was
not even before the Utah Supreme Court on appeal and the Court
expressly declined to express an opinion on whether the trial
court's conclusion on that issue was appropriate. 636 P.2d at
1065 n.2. Moreover, in Arnold, the termination procedures
involved were expressed in mandatory language and, contrary to
O.P. 6-5.2, there was no indication in the Arnold opinion that the
employer had discretion as to whether to apply the procedures or
whether the employer had clearly set forth its intent not to alter
the at-will status of its employees, as First Security has done.
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followed with respect to other employees who were involuntarily
terminated.
1.

Sanderson's contentions are simply contrary to fact.
By Its Terms, The Disciplinary Guidelines of O.P.
6-5.2 Are Discretionary And Need Not Be Followed In
All Circumstances.

Without explanation, Sanderson states that the language
of O.P. 6-5.2 is mandatory.

By its express terms, however, O.P.

6-5.2 merely suggests discretionary guidelines which may be used
when dealing with disciplinary problems:
POLICY
First Security follows the managing for
improvement procedure as- a guideline for
disciplinary action taken by management for all
First Security employees^ (Emphasis addend.)
More importantly, the section of O.P. 6-5.2 which
addresses employee termination is expressly denominated as a
"guideline" and provides that the procedure set forth therein need
not be followed depending on the gjrcumgtgnceg:
TERMINATION GUIDELINES
6. In situations where employee behavior
warrants immediate termination, the stages of
this process do not need to be followed.
Termination of these cases must be approved by
the appropriate Division/Subsidiary Head Office.
The discipline steps set out in O.P. 6-5.2 are simply not
mandatory-

The policy is denominated as a guideline, is couched

in permissive language, and the language clearly allows for
immediate termination in management's discretion with proper
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approval.

It is undisputed that proper approval was given for

Sanderson's termination,

Sanderson's claim that O.P. 6-5.2 is by

its terms mandatory is unfounded.
2.

Sanderson's Subjective Understanding That O.P. 6-5.2
Was Mandatory Is Not Sufficient To Overcome His
At-Will Employment Status.

Sanderson argues, in essence, that
concerned" O.P. 6-5.2 was mandatory.

M

as far as he was

To overcome the presumption

of employment at-will, however, Sanderson must show more than his
"subjective understandings or expectations."
(Utah 1986).

Rose, 719 P.2d at 86

Instead, he must show that O.P. 6-5.2 contains "a

clear intention on [First Security Leasing's] part to surrender
its . . . power to terminate its employees at will,"

Butterfield

v. Citibank of South Dakota, N.A., 437 N.W.2d 857, 859 (S.D.
1989); see also Berube, 771 P.2d at 1044; and Rose, 719 P.2d at 86.
O.P. 6-5.2 does not indicate any intention, let alone a
"clear intention," to alter Sanderson's at-will employment
status.

Therefore, Sanderson's subjective understanding to the

contrary is not sufficient to preclude summary judgment.
3.

Sanderson's Experience Regarding The Termination Of
Other First Security Leasing Company Employees
Further Evidences That O.P. 6-5.2 Is A Discretionary
Guideline.

Sanderson relies on "his experience" that specific other
First Security Leasing Company employees were involuntarily
terminated pursuant to the guidelines of O.P. 6-5.2.
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During his

deposition, Sanderson identified four employees he claims were
terminated pursuant to those procedures.

A review of those

individual's files demonstrates, however, that only one of the
four individuals was terminated pursuant to those guidelines.
(Affidavit of T. D. Edmunds, Wf 3-7, R. 91-94; Supplemental
Affidavit of T. D. Edmunds, 1[ 4,# R. 108-115.)

Sanderson now

claims that he applied the procedures of O.P. 6-5.2 to "an"
employee.

The fact that the guidelines were only applied to some

terminations but not others reinforces that O.P. 6-5.2 merely
provides guidelines which First Security Leasing may follow at its
discretion depending on the facts and circumstances of each
situation.
The district court correctly found that Sanderson
produced absolutely no evidence that the discipline guidelines set
forth in O.P. 6-5.2 are mandatory, and therefore, failed to meet
the burden of showing that O.P. 6-5.2 evidences First Security
Leasing Company's intent to alter his at-will employment status.
Summary judgment was therefore appropriate under the standard
established in Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
4.

Even If the Discretionary Guidelines Are Part of An
Implied Employment Contract, They Do Not Alter the
At-Will Status of Sanderson.

Sanderson cites Arnold v. B. J. Titan Services Company,
783 P.2d 541 (Utah 1989) as establishing that the following test
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should govern the Court's decision of this appeal:

(1) whether

the termination is made without adherence to the procedures set
out in the operating manual; (2) whether the discharge violated
the procedures set out in the operating manual; and (3) whether
there was justification for not following the procedures.
Sanderson also contends, in reliance on Arnold, that the Court
should reverse the district court's summary judgment, direct that
judgment be entered against First Security, and remand for a trial
only on the issue of damages.

Sanderson's reliance on Arnold is

misplaced.8
Unlike Arnold, the issue in this case is not whether
First Security was justified in not following O.P. 6-5.2, but
whether the discretionary guidelines of O.P. 6-5.2 alter

b

Arnold did not involve the question of whether B. J. Titan's
termination procedures were mandatory or discretionary. The trial
court concluded that Titan's procedures (which were expressed in
mandatory language) governed Arnold's termination and that Titan
failed to either follow those procedures or offer justification
for failing to do so. The trial court dismissed Arnold's claim,
however, on the basis that there was lack of assent and
consideration between Arnold and B. J. Titan.
On appeal, neither party attacked the trial court's findings.
Thus, the only issue was whether there must have been "mutual
assent or additional requisite consideration between Arnold and
B. J. Titan regarding the procedures set forth in the operating
manual." id. at 542. Because Berube, which was decided after the
trial court's decision in Arnold, held that mutuality of assent
and independent consideration were not required for
implied-in-fact promises, the case was remanded for a hearing on
the issues of damages, id. at 544.
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Sanderson's at-will employment status.

O.P. 6-5.2 is simply a

discretionary guideline that expressly provides that First
Security is not required to apply the guidelines in every
instance.

The district court was therefore correct in concluding

that O.P. 6-5.2 did not evidence any intent on First Security's
part to alter the employment-ati-will status of its employees even
if the "guidelines" were part of an implied employment contract.
The district court's conclusion is entirely consistent with this
Court's concern in Berube that "due deference be paid to
managerial discretion and normal employment decisions."

Berube,

711 P.2d at 1046 (recognizing also that the implied-in-fact
contract exception to the presumption of at-will employment "will
not eliminate the at-will construction of most employment
contracts.")
At the very least, if the Court were to find a factual
issue as to whether O.P. 6-5.2 was mandatory it would be necessary
to remand the factual issue as to whether this was sufficient to
alter the at-will status, and whether First Security was justified
in not following its procedures, for jury resolution along with
the issue of damages.
5.

First Security Does Not Rely on the Statements of
the Handbooks as "Disclaimers."

In his brief, Sanderson discusses a number of
-disclaimer" cases for the proposition that one may disclaim
termination procedures only if the disclaimer is clear and
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conspicuous.

Sanderson argues that "First Security did not, and

under Utah case law could not, disclaim its mandatory
procedures."

(Appellant's Brief, p. 25, emphasis added.)

Sanderson misses the mark.

First Security does not rely on the

statements in the Benefits and Standards Handbooks as
•'disclaimers.M

Rather, the discretionary termination provisions

of O.P. 6-5.2 do not alter the at-will relationship with First
Security which is clearly and unequivocally established in
writing, one of which was signed and attested to by Sanderson.

As

a result, there was nothing for First Security to "disclaim".
Sanderson simply has not come forward with sufficient evidence
demonstrating First Security's intent to alter its at-will
relationship with its employees.

Summary judgment was therefore

appropriate under the Celotex standard.
C.

The Alleged Oral Statements Are Not A "Clear And
Unequivocal" Offer Of Continued Or Specified Employment.
In addition to O.P. 6-5.2, Sanderson claims that his

employment-at-will status was altered by certain oral assurances
by a First Security employee.

Sanderson has the burden of estab-

lishing that the alleged oral assurances are not merely encouragement or optimism, but instead constitute a "clear and unequivocal" offer by First Security Leasing of (a) employment for a
specified period of time or (b) that he would be terminated only
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for cause.

See Mursch, 851 F.2d at 990-

The reason for requiring

a clear unequivocal offer is obvious:
A casual remark made at a meeting, a
phrase plucked out of context, is too fragile a
base on which to rest such a heavy obligation
inherent in such a contract.
* * *

[E]mployers and employees, like everyone
else, sometimes speak in hyperbole to express
their feelings of loyalty and friendship but
without intent to invoke the heavy machinery of
the law to enforce the literal meaning of these
words.
Id at 997-98.
Sanderson has not come forward with any evidence which
even suggests that First Security made him an offer of employment
for a specified period or that he would be terminated only for
cause.

Sanderson concedes that First Security Leasing did not

offer him either lifetime employment or employment for any
specified duration.

(Sanderson Depo., pp. 244-47, 355, R. 311.)

Moreover, Sanderson does not contend that any assurance was made
that he would be terminated only for cause or, for that matter,
that the grounds for a possible termination where even mentioned.
(Sanderson Depo., 244-47, R. 311.)

In fact, the alleged

assurances did not even specify a particular job.

The extent of

the oral assurances upon which Sanderson relies is simply that
when he recovered from his medical and emotional problems "the job
would be there."
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The statements of Cummings, even if made, amount only to
encouragement and optimism.

Such general statements do not rise

to the level of an offer for a specified period of employment.
§_££ Berube, 771 P.2d at 1044-46 (the Court noted that due
deference must be paid to management's discretion to have
employment at-will, and held that the burden was on the employee
to show an enforceable promise of employment for a specified
duration or to limit the reasons for dismissal).^
The only conclusion that can be drawn is that Sanderson
was an at-will employee and that neither First Security nor
Sanderson intended to create other than an at-will relationship.
Therefore, the district court was correct in dismissing
Sanderson's breach of contract/wrongful discharge claim.

y

Se_e, also, Braiq v. Palace Company, 4 IER Cases 1264 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1989) (assurance that a position was secure Mas long as he
performed well," absent a fixed duration, was found not to change
at-will status); Merritt v. Edson Express, Inc., 437 N.W.2d 528,
529-30 (S.D. 1989) (assurance that the job was there "as long as
you want it" was found to be a general statement that did not
change at-will status); Peters v. MCI Telecommunications Corp.,
685 F. Supp. 411, 414 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (statement that the
plaintiff could "expect long-term employment" was found to be less
specific than a promise of lifetime employment and did not change
an employee's at-will status).
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II.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DECIDED SANDERSON'S BREACH OF
CONTRACT/WRONGFUL DISCHARGE CLAIM AS A MATTER OF LAW.
In CelPtex Corp. vt Cstrett, 477 U,S, 317 (1986), the

court clarified the proper allocation of the burden of proof on
motions for summary judgment and made it clear that Rule 56
mandates the entry of summary judgment "against a party who fails
to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an
element essential to that party's case, and on which that party
will bear the burden of proof at trial."

X£l. at 322.

When a movant does not carry the ultimate burden of
persuasion on an issue at trial, the movant's burden is only one
of production for purposes of a motion for summary judgment.

The

burden can be satisfied simply by showing that there is an absence
of evidence to support the nonmovant's case.

Then:

Once the moving party has met its initial
burden of production, the burden shifts to the
nonmoving party to designate 'specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial.' . . . The mere existence of a
scintilla of evidence in support of the
plaintiff's position will be insufficient;
there must be evidence on which the jury could
reasonably find for the plaintiff.
Id. at 323.
First Security has met its burden of production by
establishing by competent evidence that O.P. 6-5.2 is
discretionary and does not promise that any specific disciplinary
procedures will be followed, and that the alleged oral assurances
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do not contain any of the essential terms of a contractual offer
for continued employment.

Both the Employee Benefits Handbook and

the Standards Handbook Sanderson received clearly and unequivocally provide that Sanderson was an at-will employee.

Sanderson

knew from reading the Standards Handbook periodically that he
could be terminated at any time.

The burden was therefore upon

Sanderson to show, by specific facts, that First Security intended
to alter his at-will employment.

As Sanderson did not come

forward with any such evidence, the district court correctly
concluded that First Security was entitled to summary judgment.
III. UTAH HAS NOT RECOGNIZED A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR VIOLATION OF A
COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING IN EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS.
Sanderson contends that although Berube and several
subsequent Utah decisions have refused to recognize a cause of
action for breach of a covenant of good faith and fair dealing in
employment contracts, the courts have not yet rejected that cause
of action.

In so contending, Sanderson relies on Lowe v. Sorenson

Research Co., Inc., 779 P.2d 668 (Utah 1989).

Lowe does not even

address the question at issue and does not stand for the
proposition cited.
In Lowe, the plaintiff, alleging that she was improperly
terminated, asserted three tort theories against her employer.
The district court, prior to Berube, granted the employer's Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.

In light of Berube, this court
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vacated the motion to dismiss and remanded for further proceedings,
not on plaintiffs theory of breach of an implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing, 10 but on an implied contract theory.

The

court, noting that Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is only appropriate if
plaintiff could not recover under the facts alleged, found that
"Lowe has stated such a claim for breach of contract."
She claims generally that her discharge was in
violation of the terms of a company manual that
prescribed policies and procedures governing
the discharge of employees. Construing these
allegations in a light most favorable to Lowe,
the facts support a claim for contract damages
under Berube.
Id. at 669-70 (emphasis added).
Therefore, Lowe is consistent with Berube, Loose v.
Nature-All Corporation, 785 P.2d 1096 (Utah 1989) 1 1 , and Caldwell
v. Ford, Bacon & Davis Utah. Inc., 777 P.2d 483, 485 (Utah 1989)
in refusing to recognize liability for breach of a covenant of
good faith and fair dealing in an implied-in-fact employment
agreement.

iU

There is no discussion in Lowe whatsoever regarding whether Utah
recognizes a cause of action for breach of a covenant of good
faith and fair dealing.
1

-'•Loose was decided after Lowe, and the court specifically
addressed the issue of whether Utah recognizes a, cause of action
for breach of a covenant of good faith and fair dealing. In
Loose, the court affirmed a judgment of dismissal "because Utah
law does not recognize a cause of action for violation of a
covenant of good faith and fair dealing." Xd. at 1098.
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IV.

DAMAGES FOR EMOTIONAL DISTRESS ARE NOT RECOVERABLE UNDER
PLAINTIFF'S CONTRACT CLAIM.
Even assuming Sanderson had a valid claim against First

Security Leasing for breach of an implied employment contract,
Sanderson cannot recover for "mental and emotional distress,
anxiety and depression, mental anguish and damages to his good
name and reputation."12

Emotional distress and similar damages

are not recoverable under a contract theory:
[T]he general rule, with few exceptions,
is to 'uniformly deny' recovery for mental
distress damages although they are 'foreseeable
within the rule of Hadley v. Baxendale.' The
rule barring recovery of mental distress
damages — a gloss on the generality of the
rule stated in Hadley v. Baxendale — is fully
applicable to an action for breach of an
employment contract.

xz

Sanderson does not contend that mental distress damages were
"reasonably contemplated by the parties" when the discretionary
guidelines of O.P. 6-5.2 were put into effect. Sanderson relies
solely on the alleged oral assurances in support of his claim for
mental distress damages. As a result, if the Court finds that the
alleged oral assurances as a matter of law were insufficient to
create an implied contract, Sanderson's claim for emotional
distress damages would necessarily fail. Moreover, Sanderson
offers absolutely no evidence that mental distress damages were
"reasonably within the contemplation of" the parties at the time
the alleged oral assurances were made. See Berube, 771 P.2d at
1050. Instead, Sanderson argues that such damages were reasonably
foreseeable at the time the alleged implied contract was breached,
i.e., the time First Security offered Sanderson a different
position. Because Sanderson has not presented evidence that
mental distress damages were contemplated "at the time the
contract was made," his claim for such damages fails as a matter
of law under Celotex.
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Valentine v. General American Credit, 362 N.W.2d 628, 630 (Mich.
1984) (citing McCormick, Damages, § 163, p. 637-638 and cases
cited therein).

See also Fogleman vy Peruvian Associates*/ 622

P.2d 63, 65 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981) (the court denied recovery for
emotional distress, anxiety, embarrassment and humiliation for
breach of an employment contract because it recognized that mental
distress and similar damages are not susceptible to computation
and "cannot reasonably be presumed to have been within the contemplation of the parties when they entered into the contract").
In Berube, the court recognized that actions such as
Sanderson's are actions in contract.

Therefore, Sanderson is not

entitled to recover mental distress or the other similar tort
damages sought unless he alleges and proves an independent claim
for intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress.
See DeMarco v. Publix Super Markets, Inc., 360 So.2d 134, 136
(Fla. Ct. App. 1978).

As Sanderson has not even asserted such

claims, nor could he establish the requisite elements of such
claims, the district court correctly found that he is not entitled
to recover the damages sought.
Moreover, other than stating that "it is not real easy to
get fired" and claiming loss of self-esteem and confidence,
Sanderson cannot state any manifestation of emotional distress he
suffered as a result of his termination.
pp. 368-69, R. 311.)

(Sanderson Depo.,

He did not see doctors any more frequently
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after termination than before.
R. 311.)

(Sanderson Depo., p. 361,

Sanderson simply does not state any degree of mental

distress other than that which results from any breach of
contract, and which is uniformly denied as an element of contract
damages.

See Valentine, 362 N.W.2d at 630.

Therefore,

Sanderson's potential recovery is limited to contractual damages
and recovery for mental distress and anguish is excluded.
V.

THE DISTRICT COURT WAS CORRECT IN ALLOWING THE FILING OF
SANDERSON'S DEPOSITION.
A.

First_Securifcy_kea-5inq Company Had The Option Of Either
Citing To Or Attaching Copies Of The Deposition Pages
Relied Upon.
Sanderson argues that First Security Leasing Company was

not entitled to have his deposition filed because it cited to but
did not attach copies of the relevant pages of Sanderson's
deposition.

Under the Utah Code of Judicial Administration, First

Security had the option of either citing to or attaching the
deposition pages relied upon:
All motions . . . shall be accompanied by a
memorandum of points and authorities,
appropriate affidavits and copies of or
citations by page number to relevant portions
of depositions, exhibits or other documents
relied upon and in support of the motion.
(Utah Code of Judicial Administration, Rule-501(1)(a), emphasis
added.)
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In its statement of uncontested facts below, First
Security cited to and quoted from relevant pages of Sanderson's
deposition.

First Security also read from Sanderson's deposition

during oral argument.

Sanderson had the opportunity in his

memorandum in opposition to and in oral argument to object to,
refute or explain those citations.

To the extent he did not, the

district court was entitled to rely upon those statements of fact
as being accurate reflections of Sanderson's deposition transcript.
B.

SandLerson's Deposition Must Be Filed With_The Court For
Any Portion Qf Thgt Deposition TQ Be Considered Qn Appeal.
In his attempt to keep his deposition from being filed,

Sanderson argued below that only the deposition pages he attached
to his memorandum in opposition should become part of the record
on appeal.

It is clear, however, that Sanderson's deposition must

be filed before any portion of that deposition may be cited to or
considered by an appellate court.

Alford v. Utah League of Cities

and Towns, 129 U.A.R. 49, 52 n.3 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (in
resolving an appeal, an appellate court may not consider
depositions which have not been filed with the district court");
see also Diaflon, Inc. v. The Allied Chem Corp., 534 F.2d 221,
226-27 (10th Cir. 1976) (court on appeal may not properly consider
depositions not filed with district court).
Therefore, for either party to rely on Sanderson's
deposition on appeal, the deposition must be filed.
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If the

deposition had not been filed, Sanderson would have absolutely no
evidence before either the district court or this Court that First
Security intended to alter his at-will employment status, as he
relies solely on his deposition to support his claim.

Therefore,

the district court was correct in allowing the filing of
Sanderson's deposition.
C.

In Any Event, The Relevant Pages Of Sanderson's
Deposition Were Attached To Sanderson's Memorandum In
Opposition.
Even if it were necessary to provide the district court

with the relevant pages of Sanderson's deposition, contrary to the
clear wording of Rule 501(1)(a), those pages were attached as
Exhibit "E" to Sanderson's memorandum in opposition.
Pages 162-198.)

(Record

All of the deposition pages and other documents

First Security relied upon regarding the following issues were
attached to either First Security's or Sanderson's memorandum and
provided to the district court:
1. The provisions of the employment
handbooks First Security Leasing Company
provided to Sanderson (R. 80-81, 83-84);
2. Sanderson's access to such handbooks
(R. 174);
3. Sanderson's understanding of the
provisions of those handbooks (R. 175-81);
4. Sanderson's certification statement
acknowledging that he had read those provisions
(R. 86);
5. Sanderson's refusal of First Security
Leasing Company's offer of transfer (R. 168-69);
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6. The provisions of First SecurityLeasing Company's Operations Procedures Manual
(R. 88-90 and 139-41);
7. Sanderson's understanding of the
provisions of the Operations Procedures Manual
(R. 189-90);
8. The alleged oral assurances First
Security Leasing Company made to Sanderson
(R. 181, 187); and
9. The discussion regarding the specifics
of those alleged oral assurances (R. 181, 187).
The only deposition pages First Security cites to which
were not attached to Sanderson's memorandum concern the background
and other information not determinative of issues before the court
in First Security Leasing Company's Motion for Summary Judgment:
1. Sanderson's employment background with
First Security Leasing Company;
2.
zation;

The reasons for Sanderson's hospitali-

3. The number of days Sanderson missed
from work because of his illness; and
4. The individual who replaced Sanderson
and the date of such replacement.
Therefore, the concern of Sanderson, and of the court in
Territorial Savings & Loan Association v. Baird, 781 P.2d 452
(Utah Ct. App. 1989), upon which Sanderson relies, that the court
did not have the relevant deposition pages before it when it
decided the motion, is simply unfounded.

The relevant evidence

from Sanderson's deposition was before the district court when it
decided the motion for summary judgment.
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CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, First Security respectfully
requests that the Court affirm the district court's summary
judgment and order.
DATED this

1^»

day of December, 1990.
NEBEKER

let Hugie Smith
Rick L. Rose
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee
RLR+402
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

wt

I hereby certify that on the J 1 day of December, 1990,
four (4) true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of
Appellee were mailed, postage prepaid, to the following:
Thomas R. Karrenberg
Bruce Wycoff
ANDERSON & WATKINS
700 Valley Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Ufe^h 84^1-2018
Attorneys for Plgintiff/Appelant

RLR+402
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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
RUSSELL W* SANDERSON,

;
\

Case No.

900254

Plaintiff/Appellant,

vs.
FIRST SECURITY LEASING COMPANY,
a Utah corporation,

1

Defendant/Appellee.
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->ening, you may be considered for advancement.

employment Duration
7* mployment with First Security is "at will" employment
_j and is, therefore, not for any fixed period of time your
nployment with First Security is at the will and discretion
f First Security and may be terminated at any time by First
ecunty or by you ;LS an employee.

DN THE JOB
Working Status
mployees are classified as full-time, part-time, or temporary. Full and part-time employment means that you
ire scheduled to work a certain number of hours each work
week, subject to the company's discretion. Temporary
employment is for a specified period or in a job on an intermittent basis. The extent of participation in the First Security
benefits program is based on your employment status.
In addition, the federal Fair Labor Standard Act classifies
employees into two general categories based on requirements
for minimum wages and overtime compensation:
a. "Exempt" includes executives, professional,
administrative employees and certain sales representatives as defined by the U.S. Department of l-abor.
b. "Nonexempt" includes all other employees.
If you are considered a nonexempt employee, you are
covered under the provisions of the Act and are eligible for
overtime pay when applicable.

E

Working Hours

T

he number of hours worked, start, and completion times
differ throughout the organization. Your supervisor will
explain the working hours in your office. First Security's
standard work week is from 12:01 a.m. Sunday to midnight
Saturday.

Report of Hours Worked
onexempt employees are responsible for recording on a
time sheet the hours worked each day. Please record
your time in and out to the nearest five minutes Time

N
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S

ince First Security is open continuously during the working day, lunch and break periods are scheduled on a staggered basis in most offices. The length of the scheduled
lunch period varies throughout the organization to suit the
needs of the office. Lunch periods, however, may not be less
than 30 minutes. Morning and afternoon break periods of 15
minutes each are provided. The lunch period is not time
worked, but the break periods are included as work time.
Your supervisor will explain the scheduling of lunch and
break periods for your department or office

Dress P(5licy

F

irst Security's dress and grooming policy is a business
standard that avoids extremes in fashions and hairstyles.
We have responded to changes in fashion, modifying the
accepteel standards of appropriate business dress to include
more variety^ inrCQlors, styles, .textures and lines, and we will
continue to do so. The financial services industry has
historically expected employees to dress conservatively and
moderately, and this philosophy stili applies. Your supervisor
or the Human Resources Division will be happy to answer
any questions you might have regarding appropriate dress
and grooming standards. Inappropriate dress will result in
counseling by your supervising officer or manager.

Personal Data
e sure that your personnel records are correct and up to
date. Please notify your local personnel officer of any
changes in your marital status, number of dependents, home
address or telephone number. If you have furthered your
education or received any special honors or recognitions,
wed like to know.
Changes in dependent medical insurance coverage must
be reported within 30 days to the Benefits Department.

B

Personal Telephone Calls/Mail
irst Security's telephone system plays an important part
in the conduct of daily business. While you may make or
receive essential local personal calls, habitual use of the

F
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First Security

Corporation

AND SUBSIDIARY COMPANIES

PER-oi R J/M

Conflict of Interest

20

Business Ventures
Investments
Margin Accounts
Repossessions
Retired or Obsolete Company Property
Confidential Information
Borrowing from C u s t o m e r s and Employees
Account Relationships
'
Lending to Relatives
Use of First Security Letterhead'

,.

20
20
21
21
21
22
22
22
23
23

Trust Group Rules

24

Outside Employment

26

Insurance, Real Estate Investments,
O t h e r Employment
Officership, Directorship or Partnership
of Outside Concerns
Church, Charitable, Fraternal or Civic
Activities
Fees
Fiduciary Appointments
Employment in Securities Business
Contributions

26
• 27
27
27
28
28
30

Political Contributions
Civic, Religious, Charitable Contributions
Employee Contributions
Employee Responsibilities

30
30
30
31

Use of Microcomputers

32

Equal Employment O p p o r t u n i t y Statement

33

A Summary of Offenses Under Federal Banking Laws

34

Employee Compliance with Standards

35

Statement of Compliance
Exceptions to Standards
•
Pre-Existing Violations of Standards
Employee Appeal Process

35
35
35
36
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GENERAL STATEMENT OF POLICY
First Security's reputation for honesty, integrity, and safety is the
sum of the personal reputations of its employees. First Security
d e p e n d s u p o n the talents and efforts of its employees for its
excellent performance.
First Security Standards for Employee Conduct is intended to govern
your actions and working relationships with customers, fellow
employees, competitors, government representatives,
communications media, or any one else by w h o m you may be
identified as an employee of First Security. Furthermore, what you
are prohibited from doing u n d e r these standards shall not be done,
or knowingly permitted to be d o n e indirectly, through relatives
friends, or otherwise.
There may be occasions w h e n First Security must change rules
or give current rules a different interpretation than previously
made. First Security has the right to modify policies, both written
and unwritten. The language used in these standards is not
intended to create, nor is it to be construed as, a contract between
First Security and any or all of its employees.
Employment with First Security is "at will" employment and is,
therefore, not for any fixed period of time. Your employment with
First Security is at the will and discretion of First Security and may
be ended at any time by First Security or by you as' an employee.
The terms "First Security" and "Company", as used in these
standards, mean First Security Corporation and each of its
subsidiary companies. The term "employees" includes all full and
part-time employees of First Security Corporation and each of i'
subsidiary companies. The term "senior management" denotes the
position of senior vice president or higher.
In many situations involving ethical or moral judgments, it may
be difficult to determine the correct course of action. In such
instances, you are not required to rely solely on vour own judgment
but are encouraged to discuss the matter in full with your
supervisor. Full disclosure of the facts in timely fashion to proper
authority, with resulting approval, will always serve to meet your
responsibilities with respect to these standards.
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Exhibit C

Corporation
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NAME

(OMI'AMI'.

EMPLOYEE NUMBER

J ^ ^ ^

0FI:JCE/DEPARTMEN'C^^^^4^^^

- f e ^

I certify that:
1)

1 have fully read and understand First Security Standards for Employee Conduct, PER-91; and

2)

1 am aware that compliance with these Standards is a condition of my employment; and

3)

I am in compliance with these Standards^ind have no exceptions that have not previously been reported
except the following. (Enter below any matters which should be reported that are not already on
record If none, enter "None.")

^&^&&££

x^U^^o

» Employee's Signature

Dace

Supervisor's Review:
To my knowledge, the above employee is in compliance with First Security Standards for Employee Conduct, Form
PER-91, and has reported any matters required to be on record.

Security
Corporation

Z ^ ^ S ^ ^ 2 ± L

sJAME

EMPLOYEE NUMBER

I certify that:
1)

1 have fully read and understand First Security Standards for Employee Conduct, PER-91; and

2)

1 am aware that compliance with these Standards is a condition of my employment; and

3)

1 am in compliance with these Standards and have no exceptions that have not previously been reported
except the following: (Enter below any matters which should be reported that are not already on
record. Jf nonelycntcr "None.")

^o^^^yO^

zc

Employee's Signature

-*&*&>
Dace

upervisor's Review:
To my knowledge, the above employee is in compliance with First Security Standards for Employee Conduct, Form
'ER-91, and has reported any matters required to be on record.
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SUBJECT:
OP 6 - E-TJ p 1 oye e Re 1a1 1 o i i s
Employee R e l a t i o n s and T e r m i n a t i o n s
M
a n a o i n a f o r Imorovement Procedure

PCLIC I
1
Ff rst
S e c u r i t y f o l l o w s the Hanaoing foi
lintproYement Procedure as a
g u i d e l i n e f o r d i s c i p l i n a r y a c t i o n takei i by management f o r all I Fi p, r Vecurr.v
Employees ( o f f i c e r / n o n - o f f i c e r ) .

PROBLEMS ADDRESSED BY THE MANAGING FOR IMPROVEMENT PROCEDURE
2,
7ne Managing f o r
types o f d i s c i p l i n a r y
(a'
(b)

Improvement
problems

Procedure
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DOCUMENTING THc HAWAGIHG FOR IMPR0YEMEN1 PROCEDURE
11 i

"~ r u m e n t a t f on I s d e s c r i b e d
•2 t i c n S e r i e s , Employment Piraet
Documentation a t the informal
Personnel F i l e ,
(b)

Docunentation
Ptrsonnel F i l l !

MANAGING >W
(a)
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stage fs not r e t a i n e d in the

stage
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in
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Employe
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1KPRUYEMLNI PROCEDURE

I n f o r m a l Stage - The Informal stage i s used to address i n 11ia 1 job
p e r t o n n a n c e / p o l i c y v i o l a t i o n problems.
f3 )

D i s c u s s t h e s i t u a t i o n w i t h the enploye
employee and work, t o g e t h e r tc - d t r e m n n f i
problems.

(2 )

I f a j o b performance prob 1 em
has had s u f f i c i e n t t r a i n i n g .

J s t e n t c the
*~- apparent

) f me employee

fDJEFENDANT^S:

EXHIBI'

OP 6 - 5 . ?
\TAG*

2
^

NOV 1 6 g f f i
MANAGING FOR IMPROVEMENT PROCEDURE (COOT)

(b)

12)

If a p o l i c y v i o l a t i o n has occurred, determine i f the employee
understands work r u l e s / p o l i c y .

(4)

Discuss appropriate behavior with the employee.
Make sure
that the employee understands what i s expected and tne
conseouences f o r repeated v i o l a t i o n .

Formal
Stage - The formal
stage
i s used to r e c t i f y
job
perrormance/pol i c y v i o l a t i o n problems which have not been resolved
at the informal s t a g e . Use of the formal stage i s also appropriate
i f the employee f a l l s into a pattern of repeated v i o l a t i o n a f t e r
showing a short term change in behavior as a r e s u l t of involvement
in tne informal s t a g e .
(i)

(21

Job Performance Problems:
(A)

When informal action i s i n e f f e c t i v e , prepare a plan for
improvement with the employee. • Describe the behavioral
change reouired, time frame a l l o t t e d for improvement, and
conseouences r e s u l t i n g frcm f a i l u r e to improve, which may
include prooation, suspension, or salary review.

(3)

If the employee does not improve performance within the
a l l o t t e d time frame, place the employee on probation for
a period of time not to exceed ninety (90) days.

(C)

If the employee does not improve performance during the
probationary period, terminate the employee in accordance
with bank/subsidiary p o l i c y .

Policy Violation Problems:
(A)

Prepare a written warning for the employee when informal
discussion of a policy violation has been i n e f f e c t i v e .
Include i record of events,, behavior that violated the
work r u l e / p o l i c y , and the conseouences resulting from
repeated v i o l a t i o n .

(B)

If v i o l a t i o n s continue after a written warning, suspend
the employee for a period of one to three days without
pay.

(C)

If v i o l a t i o n s occur after the suspension, terminate the
employee.
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TE3MHATI0H GUIDELINES
5.
Suspens i o n s / t e r m l n a t i o n s r e s u l t i n g frcm t h i s
approved by t:i te 011 v 1 s*ion/Suos1d1ary Head Office

procedure

ai e

wu oe

6
Ii i situations w hei c enpl oyee behavior warrants 'immediate terai na tioi i the
stages of this process do not -need to be followed.
Termination in "these
cases must be approved by the appropriate Dlvision/Subsidlarj Head. Office.
CCHPEHSA7I0H GUIDELINES
7.
Employees involved in the formal stage of the procedure a r e n: ", e M r i t l e
for job announcements (where applicable), and salary 1ncrea r .p'

